Abstract. This paper describes in detail a recent smart-card prototype that performs a 20-bit zero-knowledge identification in less than one second on a simple 8-bit microcontroller without any dedicated cryptoengine aboard. A curious property of our implementation is its inherent linear complexity: unlike all the other protocols brought to our knowledge, the overall performance of our prover (computation and transmission) is simply proportional to the size of the modulus (and not to its square). Therefore (as paradoxical as this may seem...) there will always exist a modulus size above which our software-coded prover will be faster than any general-purpose hardware accelerator. The choice of a very unusual number representation technique (particularly adapted to Fischer-Micali-Rackoff's protocol) combined with a recent modulo delegation scheme, allows to achieve a complete 20-bit zero-knowledge interaction in 964 ms (with a 4 MHz clock). The microcontroller (ST16623, the prover), which communicates with a PC via an ISO 7816-3 (115,200 baud) interface, uses only 400 EEPROM bytes for storing its 64-byte keys. An overhead video-projected demonstration will be done at the end of our talk.
Introduction, Context and Basic Bricks
Although crypto-dedicated smart-cards are an industrial reality since several years, the price of these components is still too high for their massive generalization. As a result, the coding of public-key primitives in simple 8-bit microcontrollers is an important commercial issue with a wide gamut of practical applications.
In the past, several software-only implementations were proposed: the first (and probably the best known) is the Fiat-Shamir implementation in the pay-TV system Videocrypt. In Eurocrypt'94, Naccache, M'raïhi, Vaudenay and Raphaeli [7] described a DSA variant based on the pre-computation of ready-to-use signature coupons. The NIST has an implementation of the DSA on an 8-bit microcontroller and other remarkable developments in this domain were achieved by Quisquater, Chaum and Fiat's company Algorithmic Research Limited.
Fischer-Micali-Rackoff 's Protocol
In Eurocrypt'84, Fischer, Micali and Rackoff [4] , presented a factoring-based zero-knowledge protocol for proving the knowledge of a secret s (which modular square v is published by the prover).
In itself, this protocol (actually a Fiat-Shamir [3] with k = 1) is very simple:
1. The prover picks a random r, computes and sends to the verifier x = r 2 mod n. 2. The verifier replies with a random challenge bit b.
3. -If b = 0, the prover replies with y = r -If b = 1, the prover replies with y = rs mod n 4. and the verifier makes sure that y 2 ≡ xv b mod n
The security of this perfect zero-knowledge protocol is formally established under the sole assumption that factoring n is impossible (we incite the reader to consult [2] , [3] and [4] for more details about this method and its numerous generalizations).
The Brugia-di Porto-Filipponi (BPF) Number Representation System
Denoting by {p i } a set of c co-prime integers, any positive integer
can be uniquely represented by the list {x mod p 1 , x mod p 2 , . . . , x mod p c }. This representation [1] has the distinct advantage of allowing to perform a multiplication in linear (instead of square) complexity: if x and y are represented by the lists {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x c } and {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y c } then their product z = xy will correspond to:
Note that addition (or subtraction) is still linear in this notation (replace the elementwise multiplication by additions or subtractions modulo p i ) but modulo reduction is unfortunately far from being easy (the simplest method seems to be a Chinese remaindering followed by a conventional division). However, a particular property of Fischer-Micali-Rackoff's protocol allows the prover to skip the modular reduction as will be seen later.
Note that if the co-primes are very different from the maximum capacity of the machine words (for instance the first c primes), a considerable redundancy is introduced in each number, a more subtle coding allows to limit this redundancy to it's strict minimum (only 2 bytes are " lost " in each 128-byte value represented on 130 bytes). By choosing p 1 = 64811 and p 2 = 65521 (the biggest possible twobyte prime), most of the most (and this is not a typographic error) significant bits of p i are ones.
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After a BPF list-multiplication (scalar product), the terms of the resulting list are reduced modulo p i with Montgomery's algorithm [5] (this operation, which consists in reducing each 4-byte coordinate modulo a 2-byte p i requires eight byte-by-byte multiplications per co-ordinate and does not affect the overall time linearity).
In our particular implementation, the Montgomery parasite factors (2 −16 mod p i ) are not eliminated by the card as this operation can be trivially subcontracted to the verifier.
Randomized Modular Multiplication
In the European patent application EP 91402958.2, Naccache [6] describes how to delegate the modular reduction of the product of two integers to a powerful verifier. In this procedure (the exact parameter sizes and a complete security proof can be found in Shamir's Eurocrypt'94 paper [8] ), the sender simply adds to the product a random multiple of the modulus which is eliminated by the receiver. In other words, instead of sending z = xy mod n, the prover sends z = xy + rn (where r's role is to mask the non-reduced product xy) 2 and the receiver computes z = z mod n.
This technique is applied by our prover in the following way: after the scalar product, n (pre-recorded in the card's EEPROM in BPF format) is multiplied by a random r and added on-the-fly (as there is no carry propagation in BPF format) to the product (r 2 or sr) which is sent to the verifier. 
The Protocol
Given these building bricks, implementation is straightforward:
1. The card picks a random r, computes and sends to the PC x = r 2 + r n. r is an on-the-fly randomizer and x is represented in BPF format.
1 with this setting, g ∼ = 8.1 × 10 312 is the hexadecimal number: b0306dfa10d2bac63339d5fe274fc9ea61d4938dd4c706ea747307fc4ef1465ea49214e 30352470531fde44942461730afeca91c365bc9d867be7e06a46ceeb01ef910a4716759 2b6b3c8b837f690cc0affcb706ac22de64bc8d3f78fc90a3505d10ea547c63e86983f98 68d78084b5533044d865c1cd6f40053396ec2f7783f4d61. 2 r should normally be bigger than n by about ten bytes. 3 The generation of a pseudo-random r, both in BPF and such that:
, by a proprietary algorithm. Although very low, the complexity attained by our prover is not a provable minimum: it is tempting to imagine that a sub-linear complexity would simply mean that some of the modulus bits are not read by the prover but (surprisingly) such may be the case if the modulus is voluntarily chosen to be redundant (for instance, n can be generated to be compression-suitable). Also, and as paradoxical as this may seem, there exists a modulus size above which our software-coded verifier will be faster than any general-purpose hardware accelerator.
Implementation and Performances
The communication amount requested by our prototype is 285 bytes per round (5700 for jumping over " mystic " 1/1000,000 security level barrier). When transmitted according to the ISO 7816-3 standard at 115,200 bauds this transmission takes 0.6 seconds).
An EEPROM option allows to halve the communication by allocating 128 additional bytes and using 3 different secrets (without multiplying them by each other as done in the Fiat-Shamir: after the commitment phase, the verifier simply " points " the secret key he wants to be used in the round).
The code size (approximately 900 bytes), breaks down as follows: As explained in [6] , the randomized multiplication can be applied to Rabin's scheme as well. This can be applied to implement a very quick two-way authentication (not implemented in our prototype) where the card authenticates the PC as well:
1. The card picks a random r, and sends x = r 2 +r n (in BPF) and y = CRC (r).
The PC:
-remainders x, reduces it modulo n and computes its roots modulo n -discards the roots which CRC s do not correspond to y -encodes the remaining root w in BPF and sends it to the card 3. The card compares w and r.
⇒ Different ns should be used for sections 2 and 4 and w should not be randomized before being sent to the card. . .
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